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NATIONAL FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTING STUDY
BY ROBERT WHITMAN*

West Hartford, Connecticut

[Editor's Note: Professor Whitman was commissioned by the Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law to make a national study of fiduciary accounting
practices on behalf of the Section's Committee on Trust Administration and
Accounting. He conducted interviews or corresponded with attorneys, judges of
probate and trust officers in all 50 states, on the basis of which he prepared an
extensive report as a resource paper to enable the Committee to react to the
information, ideas and suggestions presented therein. What is published here is
Professor Whitman's condensation of his report under the supervision of Committee
Chairman Charles G. Dalton of Chicago. Section 5 of the report, discussing accounting form and content, is not reflected in the summary. It should be emphasized
that the conclusions set forth, particularly those suggesting changes in the Uniform
Probate Code's philosophy on accounting, do not necessarily represent the views
of the Committee, the Section or the American Bar Association.]
I.

INTRODUCTION

Our report searches for a reasonable and balanced fiduciary accounting
system. It seeks to provide insight into the shortcomings of present fiduciary
accounting systems, indicating areas of uncertainty.
The report is concerned with the theory of fiduciary accounting practice. It does not advance only one suggestion for change nor serve as a brief
advocating only one such change. It is more concerned with discussing the
theory of fiduciary accounting, current practices and various possible
changes.
There is no attempt to consider the likelihood that any suggestion
offered will be implemented. Opposition from groups whose interests might
be affected by the implementation of any suggestions is not evaluated.
The study was not conceived of as a vehicle for exposing incompetence,
corruption and patronage in connection with probate practice. Reference
to such conditions is made only if directly relevant to the discussion.
II. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
A. The major conclusion of the report is that the present rules and
procedures controlling fiduciary accounting practices in the United States
are not in good order. Because answers to the most basic of questions are not
clear, there is great diversity and inconsistency in practice.
B. The reason for this state of affairs is that the statutes controlling
fiduciary accounting are outmoded and there is a vacuum in the leadership
necessary to bring about change. There is doubt as to who has the authority
and responsibility to resolve basic policy questions, and put forward and
implement suggestions for change.
*Professor of Law, the University of Connecticut Law School. Professor Whitman's
recent activities include serving as Director of Connecticut's Commission to Study and Revise
the Probate Law, Director of Connecticut's Project to Create a Probate Practice Manual,
and Designee of the Probate Administrator to inspect Connecticut's Probate Courts.

468

REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:467

C. The report suggests that protection of the public interest must be
the primary goal in establishing fiduciary accounting practices and that a
national study panel should be organized and made responsible for exercising leadership in modifying and unifying fiduciary accounting practices
throughout the United States to conform to this goal.
D. Some system of critical scrutiny of fiduciary accountings is essential.
Some supervision over the form and substance of the accounting is also
required.
E. A basically new, flexible approach to fiduciary accounting should be
established, under which a fiduciary would incur his accounting responsibility from the time he accepts his office. Necessary modifications to the Uniform Probate Code and other state statutes are recommended.
F. A fiduciary office should see to it that the persons to whom the
fiduciary is responsible understand their position, are kept well informed
and are reasonably well protected. To enforce these duties, the possibility
of imposing fiduciary liability for inadequate performance, apart from proof
of actual loss, is considered.
G. The major contribution that could be made by the American Bar
Association would be to work towards the establishment of the national
study panel, which would accept ongoing responsibility for overseeing the
fiduciary accounting process. This group could be assisted by such organizations as the National Council on State Courts, American Bar Foundation,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the
American Judicature Society and the National College of Probate Judges.
III. PRESENT GOALS OF FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTING
By definition, a "fiduciary" is one who is responsible to persons. Fiduciary responsibility is one of the basic tenets of the law, universally recognized and applied in court decisions and statutes in a wide variety of
situations.
In courts of probate in the United States, the method by which persons
to whom a fiduciary is responsible are kept informed is the fiduciary's account. Generally, questions concerning fiduciary conduct are raised by making a demand for an accounting or by raising objections to an accounting.
Accordingly, in courts of probate, the concept of fiduciary accounting
is central to the existence of the fiduciary relationship. The degree to which
a fiduciary is actually held responsible for his actions depends, in large part,
upon the integrity of the system under which he accounts. Thus, to the
extent that the account of a fiduciary is not actually critically examined and
appraised, the fiduciary is not, in fact, responsible for his actions to the
persons to whom he is responsible.
For some persons there are other reasons why it is desirable that fiduciaries account. To a fiduciary the most important aspect of fiduciary accounting procedures may be that they serve as a vehicle for his obtaining
a discharge from his responsibility. In this study, practices were discovered
that tend to nullify the use of the accounting as a device that imposes actual
responsibility on the fiduciary. These practices make the fiduciary accounting primarily a vehicle for obtaining fiduciary protection.
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Courts of probate seek to continue to exercise control by requiring accountings. From the point of view of a court of probate, fiduciary accounting procedures may be important because they allow the court to control
the fiduciary by requiring him to submit his accounting for review and
approval. Historically, the fiduciary has accounted to the court of probate,
rather than directly to the persons to whom he is responsible.

IV. DESIRED GOALS OF FIDUCIARY ACCOUNTING
The really important product of fiduciary accounting is neither the
protection afforded to the fiduciary nor the power lodged in courts of probate. Fiduciary accounting procedures, like other procedures created by the
law, must be designed to protect the public interest. In the context of
fiduciary accounting, the public interest is protected only if fiduciary accounting procedures actually protect the persons to whom the fiduciary is
responsible, and the public is confident that the procedures are reasonable
and proper.
What components should be built into a fiduciary accounting system
designed to protect the public interest and foster public confidence? Consideration might be given to provisions designed(A) to allow the persons to whom the fiduciary is responsible to understand what is required under the system and the reasons for the requirements;
(B) to foster the use of accounting to keep persons to whom the fiduciary is responsible well informed about the activities of the fiduciary, of
their rights and the duties owed to them by the fiduciary;
(C) to encourage careful scrutiny of accountings, so that a fiduciary will
feel that he is under compulsion to account in a meaningful way, and that
questionable conduct on his part will be reviewed;
(D) to provide for proper supervision of the accounting process;
(E) to provide for court participation in the accounting process in a
practical, meaningful way;
(F) to build machinery to properly evaluate the accounting system and
change it when necessary; and
(G) to educate persons involved with the accounting system so they can
perform in a competent fashion.
However, the indicated task will not be easy of accomplishment. The

following observations must be considered in this regard.
1. It may be that some of the provisions called for in the report will
not be implemented in the near future, or, indeed, ever. Nonetheless, we
should not tolerate the appearance that proper procedures exist if, in fact,
that is not true. In some cases, deliberate steps are taken to hide existing
inadequacies.
2. There is a price to be paid for any procedure that involves more
than total inaction. If, on balance, we want no system of supervision of
fiduciary accounts and no system of review, this fact should be brought
dearly to the attention of the public, and particularly the persons to whom
the fiduciary is responsible.
3. Even if we do establish new procedures for reviewing fiduciary
accounts, the procedures will not be infallible and will not insure the protection of all parties in every matter.
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4. For there to be actual scrutiny of the accounts, critical evaluation
must be encouraged. This need to build in a critical look at fiduciary accounts
is not always understood or appreciated.

If the public interest is to be protected, it should be made clear to all
that a fiduciary is, by the nature of his office, a potential adversary to the
persons to whom he is responsible. It is critically important that these persons should be aware of the actual conflict in their relationship with the
fiduciary, so that they will be concerned for their own interests and act to
assure themselves that the administration by the fiduciary has been proper
in all respects.
V.

CONSIDERATION OF CURRENT PRACTICES

As surveyed by the study, the concept of fiduciary accounting exists in
some form in each of the 50 states. The fiduciary accounting systems in use
in each state and within each district within a state are quite diverse. For
instance, whether a fiduciary will informally account out of court, or will
submit a formal accounting to the court of probate, depends upon such
factors as the practices of the fiduciary, the state, the court district within
the state, the type of proceeding, whether parties are competent, whether
there is an agreement to waive an accounting, etc.
What appear as highly diverse systems on one level of examination
have, however, several common threads. Actually, from the standpoint of
their failure to achieve some of the goals of fiduciary accounting expressed
in this study, existing accounting systems that appear quite different are
actually quite similar. For purposes of analysis, in very general terms, two
patterns, identified here as System 1 and System 2, can be identified.
A. System 1. This System, accepted by the Uniform Probate Code, relieves the court of probate of the power to review a fiduciary accounting,
unless a fiduciary or a person to whom he is responsible requires the court
to do so. Decisions as to whether any accounting takes place, and, if so, in
what form it takes place, rest with the fiduciary, subject to the right of a
person to whom the fiduciary is responsible to complain if he is dissatisfied
with the accounting he receives or with the activities of the fiduciary.
B. System 2. Under System 2, fiduciary accountings are tendered to the
court of probate for "review" and parties to whom the fiduciary is responsible are given "notice" of the accounting.
Without attempting a state by state or district by district count, it can
be said, in general terms, that System 1 is in force in all states in connection
with accounting by a trustee for an inter vivos trust. Undoubtedly, the
popularity of the inter vivos trust device and the pour-over will is due in
large part to a preference for System I accounting procedures.
There is, of course, no logical reason why jurisdictions that treat other
fiduciaries under System 2 should use System I accounting procedures for
inter vivos trusts. Historically, however, courts of probate do not appoint,
and thereafter control, trustees of inter vivos trusts as they do trustees of
testamentary trusts. The Uniform Probate Code discontinues this illogical
distinction, treating all fiduciary accounting under System 1.
With regard to all other accountings by fiduciaries in courts of probate,
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in general terms, a majority of jurisdictions in the United States employ
System 2; a minority of jurisdictions, growing as the Uniform Probate Code
gains acceptance, employ System 1.

VI.

EVALUATION

OF THE SYSTEMS

Viewed against the standard that fiduciary accounting should be carried
on in the public interest to protect the persons to whom the fiduciary is
responsible, both Systems have serious shortcomings that could be overcome
without adding burdensome costs in time and expense.

A. System 1
The major shortcomings of the System 1 fiduciary accounting proceedures are:
1. Failure to provide information. There is a failure to require that
adequate information be given to the persons to whom the fiduciary is responsible, so that they may understand their situation and take steps to
protect their own interests. There is no enforceable requirement that the
fiduciary educate the persons to whom he is responsible of the need to protect their own interests.
The combination of a lack of provision for alerting persons to whom
a fiduciary is responsible concerning the need to protect their interests, and
the withdrawal of the court of probate from its historical role as protector
of the persons to whom the fiduciary is responsible creates an atmosphere in
System I jurisdictions where there is little scrutiny of fiduciary accounts. It
is not surprising, therefore, to find few questions being put to fiduciaries in
a pure System 1 jurisdiction. Regardless of how outrageous the fees, how
poor the quality of the accounting or how disastrous the management by
the fiduciary, the persons to whom he is responsible gain no assistance or
encouragement to question or challenge.
2. Failure to have court supervision. There is a failure to require the
probate court to supervise procedures for fiduciary accounting and to establish standards for the account. The fiduciary is free to account in whatever
form he chooses. Commenting on the acceptance of this pattern by the
drafters of the Uniform Probate Code, Professor Richard Wellman said:
We ... leaned away from any effort to prescribe standards for accounts
by statute. Our thinking was that fiduciaries are under several pressures.
These include (a) the need to standardize procedures for their own convenience, (b) the necessity of dealing with a few well advised beneficiaries,
and (c) concern for their exposure over long periods of time in regard to
inadequately revealed transactions. We felt that these would tend more
surely than statutory or court rule pressure to produce good results. In view
of the political power of corporate fiduciaries, we believed that routine court
proceedings or routinely administered provisions of state law inevitably
would be used more to serve the convenience of fiduciaries than to inform
beneficiaries.

The results of this study do not support the assumptions made by the
drafters of the Uniform Probate Code. Indeed, they clearly contradict the
stated assumptions.
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As found by the study, fiduciaries, left with no standards for accountings, do not produce accountings that are easily understood by the persons
to whom they are responsible. Without proper standards and supervision,
even the best motivated fiduciary cannot reasonably be expected to do so.
For, unless told to do otherwise, he will continue to use the accepted accounting forms, no matter how outdated they have become.
It is possible that, upon recommendation, the drafters of the Uniform
Probate Code will distinguish between the undesirable System 2 role of
the court of probate as reviewer of each fiduciary accounting, and the general supervisory role that the court of probate can play in establishing
general guidelines to be followed by the fiduciary in carrying out his obligation to account.
The obligation to account meaningfully is now recognized by the Uniform Probate Code. Ideally, a proper change in the Code could be recommended to provide that the court of probate shall play a supervisory role
in establishing accounting guidelines. Practically, even within the present
framework of the Code, nationally uniform rules could be promulgated and
put into effect.
It is suggested that the task of promulgating general guidelines should
not be left to each individual court of probate. Rather, a central body
should be created and made responsible for creating and updating guidelines which, when placed in effect by each state probate court system, would
bring about national uniformity. As later discussed in the study, some national organization is required to formulate necessary reforms. Without
such a national program, each state and, indeed, each court will continue to
do things as it deems best.
The study disclosed that although there is opposition to System 2 review of court accountings by courts of probate, virtually no opposition was
found to the creation of workable standardized guidelines for fiduciary
accounting and the exercise of supervisory control by the court of probate.
Because there now is an absence of official guidelines, there are no standardized accounting procedures in use in System 1 jurisdictions. In one instance
surveyed by the study, branches of the same corporate fiduciary employed
different accounting procedures. Each trust officer was left to devise an accounting system he thought best.
The study also found that often fiduciaries are under no pressure from
"well advised beneficiaries" to upgrade the accountings issued. Quite the
contrary, in order to keep expenses at a minimum, fiduciaries employing the
computer are under pressure to produce accountings at the lowest possible
cost, although the accounting may be less revealing and less understandable.
For example, one of the least understandable types of accounting is a
straight chronological listing of transactions. It is, however, the easiest and
least costly account that can be produced by computer. The popularity of
this type of account is clearly on the increase. No power now exists in the
courts of probate to ban this form of account in System 1 jurisdictions. Only
in System 2 jurisdictions, where the court can exercise supervisory control
over the form of the account, have a select group of probate judges exercised
their power to ban the use of this type of account.
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Because in System 1 jurisdictions the court of probate does not review
fiduciary accounts unless asked to do so by a person to whom the fiduciary
is responsible, there is, as compared to System 2 jurisdictions, a larger abdication of responsibility by the courts of probate for review of fiduciary and
attorney fees, even though the existence of abuses in this area is recognized
by the judges of probate.

B. System 2
The major shortcomings of the System 2 fiduciary accounting procedures are:
1. Lack of capability to review accounts adequately. This study has
found that there exists a general attitude nationally that under System 2 the
courts of probate do not effectively review fiduciary accounts. To the extent
that it is true, there are a number of factors which contribute to the ineffectiveness of the courts of probate as reviewers of fiduciary accountings.
Just as it is important to recognize that fiduciaries acting in good faith in
System 1 jurisdictions may not be capable of producing proper fiduciary
accountings because of lack of court leadership and supervision, so it is
important to understand that court personnel, acting in good faith in System 2 jurisdictions, may not be able to review fiduciary accountings adequately.
2. Quality of review is doubtful. Where the court does audit fiduciary
accountings, what actually is done? Often review procedures will stem from
the controlling state statutes concerning fiduciary accountings, most of
which have not undergone change for decades. Thus, where the statutes
call for the submission of vouchers by the fiduciary, the judge of probate
or his clerk will check vouchers.
There are several other factors contributing to the court's inability
to carry out a proper review, such as:
i. Lack of leadership.No one has told the judge of probate what should
be done by way of reviewing fiduciary accountings and the judge is incapable
or unwilling to formulate an effective program for review. Review of court
accountings is a tedious and time-consuming job. Judges of probate, particularly in larger courts, do not themselves review accounts. More importantly,
when passing the task to another, a judge does not necessarily indicate
exactly what is to be done. As found by the study, the persons who actually
perform the review by and large set their own standards of review and
exercise their own judgment as to what to do.
ii. Lack of experience. Probate court personnel may not possess any
general accounting experience or any familiarity with fiduciary accounting
principles. It must be remembered that in many courts of probate across the

nation, even judges of probate need not be and are not lawyers.
iii. Lack of facilities. In high volume courts, there may simply be too
many accountings to allow for adequate review. This was found to be the
case in several courts of probate visited during the course of the study.
3. Scope of review. In some courts of probate there is nothing more
than a checking of accountings for internal consistency. The court's audit
of an accounting consists solely of checking the original inventory of assets
and making sure that each of the assets has been shown in the account to
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have been sold or distributed, or on hand at the end of the accounting
period.
In some courts, although much time and effort are devoted to this type
of audit, little attention is paid to such important matters as the type of
investments made, the propriety of the distribution or investment performance. Use of accounting forms deemed proper by the particular court of
probate may be of uppermost importance in order to pass the audit.
In some courts, and in some jurisdictions, the attempt has been made
to require the mandatory use of particular schedules to evidence particular
transactions. Because the persons to whom the fiduciary is responsible receive
no instruction on how to read the mandatory form, in practice such stereotyped accounts may not be intelligible to persons who are not experts in
the field.
Furthermore, the court review of the accounting may degenerate into a
disagreement as to which schedule a particular entry would be more properly shown under. Invariably, the mandatory inflexible form does not cover
a particular transaction, and then much time is spent guessing which treatment is most likely to satisfy the clerk of probate. Whether the accounting
is understandable by the persons to whom the fiduciary is responsible becomes a secondary matter.
4. Sophisticated legal issues generally are not considered. In conducting
the study, an attempt was made to seek information concerning to what extent, if any, a court of probate, in reviewing accounts, considers sophisticated legal questions such as apportionment of stock splits and tax prorations. Responses indicated that, generally, a sophisticated court review is not
made, unless a specific problem has been raised by a party to whom the fiduciary is responsible.
In at least one court of probate visited during the course of the study,
it did appear that selected accountings are subjected to intensive court
review by qualified independent practitioners. Unlike the practice in other
jurisdictions, it is said that this system is not used primarily for the purpose
of providing patronage.
5. Lack of adequate notice to persons to whom fiduciary is responsible.
The fiduciary accounting statutes in force in System 2 jurisdictions generally require only that "notice" of the accounting proceeding be sent to
persons to whom the fiduciary is responsible. From correspondence received
and interviews held, it is clearly recognized that the standard notice forms
in use are totally inadequate and do, in fact, mislead persons to whom
fiduciaries are responsible. Often, the standard of practice set by a fiduciary
with regard to notice is higher than that required, since the fiduciary will
furnish a copy of the account to persons to whom he is responsible, although
he is not required to do so by the statutes.
Failure to make provision for adequate notice to the persons to whom
the fiduciary is responsible takes on crucial significance when it is realized
that, by and large, the court of probate does not actually review accounts
unless a complaint is lodged by a person to whom the fiduciary is responsible. A person to whom the fiduciary is responsible does not review
the accounting because (1) he is not told he must do so to protect his in-
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terests, (2) he is not given a copy of the accounting and (3) he is made
to believe that the account is being audited for him by the court of probate.
6. Fiduciary accounting is controlled by inflexible statutes. Under System 2, the fiduciary accounts to the court of probate because state statutes
require him to do so. The statutes are quite diverse with regard to which
fiduciaries are to account and the frequency with which they are to account.
The common statutory pattern with regard to executors and administrators
is to require the filing of an inventory within a set time after qualification,
followed by the filing of periodic interim accountings and then a final
account.
One finding of the study is that this type of statutory mandate is not
always followed in practice. Undoubtedly the rigid patterns are ignored
largely because in practice there is no underlying reason for the statutory
requirements. As already noted, the accountings are not actually reviewed
unless a complaint is made by persons to whom the fiduciary is responsible,
and those persons whose interests are affected are not given a copy of the
account or made aware of the need to protect their own rights.
System 2 patterns of accounting are not working because the persons to
whom the fiduciary is responsible are being ignored. As a result, in those
jurisdictions the accounting requirement is considered a meaningless burden imposed upon innocent people by unfeeling courts and legislators.
Logically, a rigid set of rules as to when to file an accounting is not desirable because varying circumstances, such as the size of the fund being
accounted for, the persons involved and the conditions under which the
funds are held, affect the need for an accounting and the time at which and
the form in which it is made.
Clearly, the present statutory pattern should be replaced by a more flexible system. One way of creating flexibility would be to charge the fiduciary,
as a part of fulfilling his fiduciary duty, to determine when it is best to
account to the persons to whom he is responsible. The imposition of this
duty, coupled with provisions for making the persons to whom the fiduciary
is responsible aware of the extent to which it is necessary for them to protect
their interests, should create an atmosphere in which accountings are waived,
when appropriate, or requested and subjected to intensive review, when
appropriate.
C. Shortcomings Common to Both Systems
There are several shortcomings common to both Systems of accounting
procedures.
1. Failure to curb improper use of waivers. In both System I and System
2 jurisdictions, a waiver of the accounting can be exacted from a competent
beneficiary. In System I jurisdictions, the waiver may relieve the fiduciary of
liability. In System 2 jurisdictions, it may also cause the court not to review
the account.
2. Failureresponsibly to review fees for fiduciaries and counsel. In System 2 accounting jurisdictions, fiduciary and counsel fees are the items most
closely watched by the courts of probate in reviewing fiduciary accounts.
The propriety of these fees is also considered in System I accounting juris-
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dictions if a question is raised by a person to whom the fiduciary is responsible. It is appropriate for courts of probate to have guidelines for judging
the propriety of fees where they are not controlled by statute.
Almost universally, the minimum schedule of fees set by the local bar
association is used as a guide for measuring the propriety of fees. Apart
from such schedules, there is no available guideline to assist courts of probate in reviewing fees. Even when clearly improper fees are being charged,
the judge may allow them unless a question is raised by a person to whom
the fiduciary is responsible even though that person may not be actually
informed of the fee being charged or given any indication as to how
he should judge the propriety of the fee.
Cases involving fees for multiple fiduciaries and fiduciaries who are
also counsel are handled diversely without any coherent pattern. In these
cases, it is not uncommon for a judge to accept a fee structure that the
attorneys think is best.
The problem of relying on judges of probate to control fees is accentuated in jurisdictions in which they need not be attorneys, are elected to
office or serve in a part time capacity. There is a clear need to develop
nationally uniform procedures for judges to follow in reviewing fees.

D. Role of Attorney
What makes the problem of determining appropriate counsel fees even
more vexing for the judge of probate is that there is no certainty in any
jurisdiction in the United States as to the role that counsel is to play in
connection with fiduciary accountings.
At the outset of this study, the author believed that uncertainty existed
throughout the country with regard to the question: Whom does the attorney represent in connection with fiduciary accountings? Presumably, the
underlying logic of bank-bar decisions requiring an independent attorney
to appear in proceedings held in courts of probate is that he is needed to protect the interests of persons to whom the fiduciary is responsible. Do the
cases that require the appearance of independent counsel when an accounting is submitted to a court of probate for review simply reflect a judicial
attitude that independent attorneys should be employed, whether or not
they are actually needed or have any work to do? Or should it be counsel's
task (where the fiduciary is competent and wishes himself to prepare the
accounting without the aid of counsel) to represent the interests of the
beneficiaries?
The role of counsel, as a representative of persons to whom a fiduciary
is responsible, is particularly appropriate where, as is so often the case,
counsel hired by the fiduciary is the attorney who drafted the governing
instrument and, at that time, represented the interests of the maker of the
instrument who was primarily concerned with protecting the interests of
the persons to whom the fiduciary is responsible.
One finding of the study is that the law lacks clarity with regard to
whom the attorney represents in connection with the fiduciary's administration and accounting. This, in turn, leads to uncertainty with regard to
the action that an attorney should take where he believes that conduct of
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the fiduciary is subject to question. There is also a lack of clarity with regard
to whether the fiduciary can dictate whom the attorney is responsible to.
Given bank-bar case law, requiring the retention of independent counsel,
greater flexibility in the use of such counsel would be advantageous. With
the law so unclear, attorneys are at a loss as to how to proceed.
VII. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING ACCOUNTING PRACTICES

One fact that the study seems to have demonstrated is that, in both
System 1 and System 2 jurisdictions, there is little organized thought being
given to what, if anything, should happen with regard to revision of procedures for fiduciary accounting. It is clear that there is now no group that
feels a responsibility for seeing to it that fiduciary accounting procedures
work well. The legislatures, which originally accepted the responsibility to
fashion fiduciary accounting systems, have left a legacy of rigid, outmoded
statutes. The courts of probate, empowered to review fiduciary accounts,
represent the logical group to accept leadership responsibility. To date,
however, they have not done so.
Individual judges of probate have little capacity to solve the problems
that are discussed in the report. In courts of general jurisdiction, judges may
have little expertise in probate. They are generally accustomed to spending
only a small amount of their time in the area, leaving all noncontested
matters and all questions of proper forms and procedures to clerks.
Accordingly, it is recommended that:
1. The American Bar Association should work toward the creation of
a national study panel. This panel should be charged with the responsibility of coordinating the study and resolution of the problems raised in the
report. The panel could draw upon the experience and financial support
of such organizations as the National Council on State Courts, the American
Bar Foundation, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, the American Judicature Society and the National College of
Probate Judges.
2. The panel should prepare amendments to outdated statutes and to
the Uniform Probate Code, and promulgate modifications in existing procedures. If guidelines were also promulgated, these could be put into use by
local courts of probate, thereby effecting a nationally uniform set of procedures.
3. The panel should consider recommending the adoption of more
flexible statutes. A suggested statute might read:
Fiducairies shall keep persons to whom they are responsible reasonably
informed and shall account, at such time and in such manner, as determined
by the court of probate.
4. Consideration should be given to improving notice requirements.
The draft of the Connecticut Probate Practice Book, for example, requires
the following legend to appear on the first page of each fiduciary accounting, a copy of which must be given to specified persons to whom the fiduciary
is responsible:
Notice to beneficiaries: The purpose of this account is to inform inter-
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ested parties of the manner in which the fiduciary has handled the estate
during the accounting period. It is your responsibility to carefully inspect the
account to determine if you have any objections to anything in the account.
Where any doubt exists in your mind as to the accuracy or the propriety of
anything in the account, or if you do not feel that you are capable of properly
reviewing the account yourself, you should consult an attorney to insure the
protection of your rights. If you have any objections, you must express them
to the court of probate at the hearing on the account. If you do not express
objections to the account, the court of probate may approve the account as
submitted.
5. The concept of fiduciary responsibility should be enlarged to include
a duty of reasonably informing, accounting to and protecting persons to
whom the fiduciary is responsible. The draft of the Connecticut Probate
Practice Book embraces this concept which, it is thought, will meaningfully improve fiduciary accounting by instituting a duty of disclosure by the
fiduciary to the persons to whom he is responsible from the point the fiduciary takes office, rather than after action has been taken.
6. Work should be done to create proper guidelines for judges of probate in considering the propriety of fees. Something other than minimum
bar fee schedules should be consulted. Some national uniformity should
also be attempted in practice with regard to treating fees for multiple
fiduciaries and for a fiduciary who also acts as counsel.
7. So that any new rules do not in turn become outdated, provision
should be made for a continuing study of procedures and periodic recommendations for improvement.

